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JURISDICTION
~

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0).
LIST OF AND REFERENCES TOPARTIES

Appellee is the City of Orem (the "City" herein), and Plaintiff/Appellant is
Northgate Village Development LC (''Northgate").
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Northgate's Statement of Issues does not accurately reflect the procedural and
factual context of the district court's decision, and consequently misstates applicable
standards of review. The City restates the issues as follows:
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether the district court exercised appropriate discretion in

deciding to exclude testimony from two ofNorthgate's experts who, after submitting
'vJJ)

detailed expert reports explicitly describing the factual bases for their opinions during the
discovery period, materially altered the factual bases for their opinions to make them
~

relevant and reliable only in response to the City's Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
filed after expiration of both fact and expert discovery deadlines and shortly before trial.
Preservation: The City raised and briefed this issue by its Motion to Exclude

Expert Testimony. See Record (R.) pp. 1547-58. See also R. pp. 2117-31 ("Ruling and
Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence Re: Experts").
Standard of Review: "As a general rule, district courts are granted a great deal of

deference in selecting discovery sanctions, and we overturn a sanction only in cases
evidencing a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated by
showing that the district court relied on an erroneous conclusion of law or that there was

1
HP
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no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling. Our deferential review recognizes that
trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery process." Kilpatrick v.
Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, ,r 23 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether Northgate preserved its argument on appeal; and whether
the district court erred in deciding that evidence regarding Northgate's removal of
construction material not containing asphalt should be excluded as irrelevant and more
prejudicial than probative pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 401 and 403.
Preservation: The City raised and briefed the question whether the evidence

<&

should be excluded by its Motion to Exclude Evidence Re: Fill Material. See R. 1630-36.
See also R. pp. 2250-58 ("Ruling and Order on Defendant Orem City's Motion to

Exclude Evidence Re: Fill material").
Standard of Review: "A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence
under Rule 403 ... [is reviewed for] an abuse of discretion and will be overturned only if
the trial court's determination ... is beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Burke,
2011 UT App 168, ,r 16, 256 P.3d 1102 (citation and quotation omitted). Further, "[t]he
mandate of an appellate court binds the district court and the parties and affords the
district court no discretion whether to comply with that mandate." Utah DOTv. Ivers,
2009 UT 56, ,r 8,218 P.3d 583. Whether a district court complied with the mandate of an
appellate court is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Id.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an action for breach of contract in which portions of both parties' varying

vi;

interpretations of the governing contract provisions have been upheld by the district court
and by this Court. See, e.g., Northgate Village Dev. LC v. Orem Ciry, 2014 UT App. 86. 1

B.

Course of Pertinent Proceedings and Relevant Facts.
1.

N orthgate filed this action in March 2009, alleging breach of a Real

Property Purchase and Exchange Agreement between the City as seller and N orthgate as
~

buyer (the "Contract"). The Complaint sought damages of $2,994,186.97 for costs

1In

¼j

Northgate's description of the case and statements of "fact," Northgate implies (and at
times baldly asserts) that the City had "illegally" buried thousands of tons of debris on
the subject property. See, e.g., Aplnt.'s Br. pp 4-5 ("But Orem reneged, refusing to
remove, or even accept responsibility for removal of, hundreds of thousands of tons of
debris it had illegally buried as deep as 55 feet below the surface of the Public Works
Property."). Actually the property was owned and utilized by the Utah Department of
Transportation and the United States Army Corps of Engineers prior to ownership by the
City, and Northgate's characterizations of the City's allegedly "illegal" acts are
unsupported by the record. Northgate's 30(b)(6) witness testified, for example:
Q. Why do you think they [the City] had knowledge of the underground debris
that you discovered as you dug into the property?

i.tl

~

vJ

A. I think the volume of it was so overwhelming, I just -- I don't know that the
people who wrote the contract had knowledge of it. But I believe someone in the
City had to have known the material was there.
R. p. 668. Northgate's assertions in this regard are apparently an attempt to prejudice this
Court respecting the City's actual conduct and contrary interpretations of the parties'
agreement.
3
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Northgate allegedly incurred in excavating, screening, and compacting soil on a site
purchased from the City. See R. pp. 1-4.
2.

The parties engaged in discovery pursuant to the district court's Scheduling

Orders. See, e.g., Docket; R. pp. 286-88 (Second Am. Scheduling Order). During this
period the City deposed two ofNorthgate's principals, Paul Washburn as a 30(b)(6)
designee, and a William Fairbanks, regarding Northgate's damage claims. Mr. Washburn
testified, in pertinent part:
Q. Now, in the complaint in this case, you are claiming -- Northgate is
claiming as damages the sum of $2,994,186.97. Can you tell us how that
number was arrived at, how it was computed?
A. Yes. What was done is we accumulated all of the costs that were, you
know, paying the men that were working on the job; the rental of materials,
the rental of the crusher. We had a screening operation going. We had to
rent several heavy machines. Because of the depth we were at, it required
special equipment to get it out. I don't know that it would have required
special equipment to put it there, but it definitely required special
equipment to get it out. So we had the equipment rentals. There were
tipping fees that were involved.

Q. And that work was performed by Carter Construction and its subsidiary?
A. Greenfield.
Q. Greenfield Excavation?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they do all that work?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. After they did it, did they bill N orthgate for their work?

4
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A. Yes, they did.
\tiV

Q. Do you know whether there was a written agreement between N orthgate
and Carter Construction and/or Greenfield Excavation for the work they
did?
A. No, there was not. And I believe the reason for that is this process
evolved. We started out thinking it was a very small process. When we got
clear to the end, it turned out to be much bigger than what we anticipated.
'vi)

Q. Has Northgate done any kind of an audit or check on the amounts that
have been charged to it by Carter Construction and Greenfield Excavating
for the work they did on the site?
A.No.

Q. Has Northgate had any third party examine the invoices or the volume of
work performed by Carter Construction and Greenfield to compare costs or
assess the reasonableness of the costs or anything of that nature?
A. We have not hired a company to come in and do that. I have personally
tried to keep track of those costs and make sure that they were in line with
what I was aware of industry practice. My conclusion has been I can't
believe they did it for the price they did it.
R. pp. 670-71.

3.

Similarly, another principal, William Fairbanks,2 testified:

Q. Now, the complaint that's been filed in this case seeks $2,994,000 from
the City. That's more than your entire cost of excavating on the site in total,
isn't it?

A. No, it isn't.

2

As Mr. Fairbanks testimony quoted below implies, certain ofNorthgate's principals,
either themselves or by separate entities, owned controlling interests in Carter
Construction and Greenfield Excavating, the companies that did the excavation work at
issue. N orthgate paid or was to have paid these entities for the excavation work at issue.
See also R. pp. 1607-09.
5
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Q. Isn't it a fact that the total amount billed by Greenfield Excavating was
$2,992,000?

A. I'm not quite sure what -- okay.
Q. Well, you produced invoices to us for all of the money that was
expended by Carter Construction and Greenfield Excavating on this project.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. We tallied them up and the Greenfield Excavating invoices totaled
$2,992,000.

A. Okay.
Q. You are seeking $2,000 more than that from the City. How can that be?

A. Okay, I'm going to ask your question back. You said that our excavation
on the whole site was less than -- okay, I'm confused. Ask me again. I'm
sorry.
Q. The invoices provided to us from Greenfield Excavating totaled
$2,992,000.

A. Okay. I'm taking your word for that. I'm not adding it up.
Q. Okay. And the total amount in the complaint you are asking for from the
City is $2,994,000. So it sounds to me like you are asking the City to pay
for the total amount of your excavation costs on this project. Is that right?

A. I'll have to look at the -- I'll have to look at the bills and see where we
came up with the numbers. I can't-- I can't speculate.
Q. Do you remember how you came up with the number you gave to
[Northgate's counsel] or his firm to file the complaint?

A. Just going through our records.
Q. What were the components, if you remember, of that number?

A. It was based on equipment and costs of excavation; dump fees,
everything that goes into it.
6
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~

Q. So did you just bill the City for every cost you had on this project for
any kind of site work?

vib

A.No.
Q. How much did you hold out as what you thought you should have
incurred?
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, if you don't know, who would know?
A. Well, I don't have it in front of me. I could find it out. I just don't know
right now.
[NORTHGATE'S COUNSEL]. I think he is asking-- and I don't mean to -I think he is asking how you calculated what you did to calculate, not so
much having the exact numbers in front of you, but just how you calculated
how much you attributed to Orem City versus other site work.
THE WI1NESS: We took-- we took the hours, the equipment hours, and
everything that went into it and just added it up as we went along.
Q.
(BY :MR. HUNT). How much did you bill to Northgate, LLC 3 for
your site work on the project?
~

A. I don't remember.

Q. Was it more or less than $2,994,000?

V,

A. It would have been more, because we were billing them all the time. But
just site work on this portion? Is that what you are talking about?

Q. I'm talking about site work that you charged the City for.

vJ}

A. That would have all been billed to Northgate.
Q. Did they pay you?

3

See supra n. 2.
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A.No.
Q. Did they pay any of it?
A. Some.
Q. How much did they pay you?
A. I don't remember.

Q. How much do they still owe you?
A. I am -- I'm guessing around a million and a half to $1,700,000.
R. p. 732.

4.

On or about March 21, 2011, the district court entered its Third Amended

Scheduling Order requiring, inter alia, that "Plaintiffs expert disclosures and reports shall
be made on or before April 29, 2011 [and] ... Depositions of experts, if any, shall be
conducted on or before August 31,201 l." R. p. 354.
5.

On or about May 31, 2011, Northgate served its expert disclosures pursuant

to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3). See, e.g., R. p. 371. Northgate's disclosures included an
expert report prepared by L. Deane Smith titled "Disclosure and Opinion of Plaintift' s
Economic Loss Witness." See R. pp. 1559-74.
6.

In pertinent part, Mr. Smith's report explicitly stated that his opinions were

based upon certain accounting entries and invoices prepared by a Sara Talley: 4
At the request of counsel for the plaintiff, Northgate Village Development,
LLC [Northgate], an examination of summary documents, invoices and
4At

some point Ms. Talley's last name was changed to Stevens. See R. p. 1612. To be
consistent with the original documents, the City will refer to her herein as Sara Talley in
its original text, although some quoted materials refer to her also as Sara Stevens.
8
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supporting calculations prepared by Sara Talley acting on behalf of
Northgate and a related entity, Carter Construction Company, was
conducted.

Site Clean up Costs

~

Based on invoices prepared by or under the direction of Sara Talley. funds
charged by Greenfield to Northgate for site clean up are for:
[going on to describe equipment rental, third party charges, owned
equipment operation and miscellaneous labor costs].
R. pp. 1563-64 (emphasis added); see also id. p. 1567 ("Source: Selected accounting

vu

entries from Carter Construction Company books and records for Greenfield Excavation
Company as provided by Sara Talley.") (emphasis added). 5
7.

In June and July 2011, the parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. See R. pp. 373-594; 635-732.
8.

Pursuant to the district court's scheduling order, in August 2011, Northgate

served Supplemental Rule 26(a)(3) Expert Witness Disclosures designating certain
"rebuttal experts," including Mr. Smith. See R. pp 1569. In response to the City's
expert's criticism of his reliance on invoices, in his rebuttal report Mr. Smith again
expressly stated that his own opinions were based upon the Carter Construction Company
records kept by Ms. Talley:
Terms used such as ''vague" or "incomplete" appear to be directed only to
the "pass-through" invoices from Greenfield [prepared by Sara Talley].
While these are the relevant costs of the claim, the summary invoices are
5As

noted above, Greenfield Excavation and Carter Construction Company were
Northgate related entities that actually performed the excavation work at issue. See, e.g.,
R. pp. 1607-09.
9
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supported by detailed invoices and calculations held by Greenfield's parent
entity, Carter Construction Company.... Relevant documents [with
exceptions as noted] were available and were the source of information
used to compile the summary of costs set forth in my May 2011 report and
the Northgate claim.

Id. p. 1574 (second brackets in original)(emphasis added).
9.

On April 2, 2012, the district court entered its Order on the parties' cross

motions for summary judgment and in doing so primarily granted the City's motion and
denied Northgate's motion, subject only to the City's payment to Northgate of costs
associated with the removal and disposal of buried electrical transformers. See R. 894~

97.
10.

Northgate appealed that Order, and on April 17, 2014, this Court issued its

opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's ruling. This Court also
issued a remand order in its opinion, mandating action on remand. See Northgate Vil/.

Dev., LLC v. Orem City, 2014 UT App 86, ,r 55.
11.

Relevant to the issues raised here, this Court first held:
We affirm the district court's determination that the Land Sale Contract did
not incorporate the Environmental Site Assessment or Table 1.1, which is
contained in the Environmental Site Assessment. Accordingly, we agree
that the Land Sale Contract obligates the City 'to perform only those cleanup actions listed in the ... Clean-Up List attached to the agreement.'

Id. at 131.
12.

This Court also held:
Though the Land Sale Contract requires the City to perform only the cleanup actions contained in the Clean-Up List, we agree with N orthgate that the
Clean-Up List contains ambiguities. Specifically, the Clean-Up List does
not clearly indicate how the City must deal with buried asphalt.
10
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The district court determined that the Clean-Up List required the City to
remove buried electrical transformers. Accordingly, the district court
required the City to reimburse Northgate for the cost of removing the
transformers. The district court added that the remaining Clean-Up List
requirements "relate to permitting fl and that the City "received the
necessary permission to leave the debris and landfill." One item on the
Clean-Up List reads, "Landfill operations -- burial of asphalt materials -Check permitting & closure requirements including Coordination with State
of Utah Division of Solid & Hazardous Waste." But in the section of the
Clean-Up List describing the City's clean-up responsibilities in the "Soil
Borrow & Landfill Area," there are three entries:
1. Landfilling construction materials with pieces of asphalt
2. Permit required for continued landfilling
3. Site assessment and application required for closure of site
Northgate and the City ascribe contrary meanings to this section of the
Clean-Up List. In the City's view, the first and second entries should be
read together, allowing the City to fulfill its obligation to clean up the
asphalt by simply applying for and receiving proper permits. In Northgate's
view, the first and second entries impose separate requirements: the City
must clean up the fl construction materials with pieces of asphalt" and must
also apply for and receive permits for any continued landfilling.
Both the City's reading and Northgate's are plausible. Consequently,
without reference to parol evidence of the parties' intent, we see no way to
select one reading of the asphalt provision over the other. The Land Sale
Contract therefore contains a facial ambiguity, and resolving this facial
contract ambiguity requires evidence of the parties' intent. Because "the
intent of the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the jury," the
district court erred by determining at summary judgment that the City could
fulfill its asphalt clean-up responsibilities by securing the proper permits.
We therefore vacate the district court's determination on this issue.

Id. at 1~ 36-39. (citations and footnotes omitted).
13.
~

Finally, this Court entered a remand order stating:
Because we recognize facial ambiguities in the Clean-Up List, we vacate
the district court's determination that the City satisfied its clean-up
obligations. We reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and
11
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remand to allow the district court to hear evidence regarding the parties'
intent with respect to asphalt clean-up and, if necessary, evidence of when
Northgate provided the City with oral notice of a breach.

Id. at 155.
14.

After remand, Northgate filed a Motion to Amend the Scheduling Order

Allowing Extended and Additional Expert Discovery. See R. pp. 1168-70. In support of
the motion, Northgate argued, in pertinent part:
[T]he opinion entered by the Court of Appeals restricts the scope of
Northgate's claims to areas 2 and 7 of the property as indicated by the
Environmental Clean-Up List. Northgate, pursuant to the Third Amended
Scheduling Order, completed its expert disclosures by April 29, 2011, and
expert discovery is now closed. However, Northgate's expert disclosures
are based on its claim of damages for the parcel as a whole and do not
address costs incurred by area. Because the Court of Appeals' decision
requires Northgate to identify the costs by area, additional expert discovery
is necessary for this case to be justly and fairly tried.

Id. p. 1174. See also R. pp. 1389-90 ("Because the Court of Appeals held that the
Environmental Assessment Report, as a whole, was not incorporated into the Agreement
between the City and Northgate, it is now necessary to determine the clean-up costs for
specific sections of the Public Works Parcel to determine the costs incurred to clean up
only those sections designated in the Clean-Up List which was determined to be
incorporated in the Land Sale Contract.").
15.

The district court granted Northgate's motion and on June 18, 2015, entered

a scheduling order providing in pertinent part as follows:
2. Plaintiffs expert disclosures and reports shall be made on or
before July 15, 2015.
3. Defendant's expert disclosures and reports shall be made on or
before September 1, 2015.
12
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4. Any rebuttal expert disclosures and reports shall be made on or
before September 30, 2015.
5. Depositions of experts, if any, shall be conducted on or before
November 1, 2015.
R. p. 1459.
16.
vJ

Pursuant to the schedule or agreed upon extensions, Northgate served

Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosures on July 28, 2015, and Rebuttal Expert Witness
Disclosures on December 9, 2015. See R. pp. 1425-26, 1538-39.
17.

The July 28, 2015, supplemental disclosures included a Disclosure and

Supplemental Opinion of Plaintiffs Economic Loss Witness dated July 27, 2015. In it,

Mr. Smith explicitly stated in pertinent part as follows:
Allocation of Site Remediation Costs
Based on work location designations for each Greenfield invoice prepared
by or under the direction of Sara Talley. and associated underlying
documentation reviewed by the project supervisor, charges by Greenfield to
Northgate for site remediation were allocated by pit:
Excavation "Pit" Locations
A document prepared by Greenfield in my 2011 file shows a
designation for each site remediation cost invoice by "pit" where
work effort was expended. Using this information, I have simply
divided the dollar amount of each invoice by the number of pit
locations indicated to allocate costs among work areas.
I.Jjj)

Site Remediation Surface Areas
A second allocation fact or corresponding to surface areas from
which material volumes were moved, screened and otherwise
processed was further applied to achieve an overall allocation of cost
by work area using the best information now available for that
purpose. Surface areas used in the cost allocation include an "area of
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repose" surrounding each pit location that, I am informed,
corresponds to regulatory requirements for safety. Some of the
"areas of repose" required for safety purposes, lie partially outside
areas 2 and 7 as discussed in the court's guidance.

Summary
Allocated costs for remediation efforts provided outside of work site areas 2
and 7 total $442,035. The portion of allocated costs for remediation efforts
provided at pit D outside of designated work site area 7 [55%] is $149,753.
These figures are for Northgate's incurred "out-of-pocket" costs but do not
include financial value lost due to the extension of time and for the lost use
of its funds.
In the event that "areas of repose" lying outside of the court's guiding
language are to be excluded from consideration, further allocated cost
reduction [$507,890] would apply.
R. pp. 1580-81.
18.

Northgate's July 28, 2015, supplemental disclosures also included a

detailed expert report prepared by Roy L. Bosley and Keith Sorensen. See R. pp. 157677. In the report dated July 28, 2015, Bosley and Sorensen state in pertinent part as
follows:
Most recently we were provided with a copy of a "Supplemental
Procedures and Findings" report prepared by L. Deane Smith (CPA) who is
with the firm of Smith Finlinson, LC. We have attached and referenced as
Exhibit "G" said report. Based on the information provided we have
calculated the following:
Total Remediation Costs (Ref. [Smith] 2011 Report)= $2,539,053.50
(Does not include "Unavailability of Funds" Interest)
Allocation of Costs Outside of Areas 2 & 7 = ($442,035.00)
Total Remediation Costs for Areas 2, D7 & 7 = $2,097,018.50
Taking the "Total Remediation Costs" referenced in Exhibit "G" [Smith' s
report] and dividing it by the volume in Cubic Yards as described in the
attached document, noted as "Volume Calculation by Area Designation"
and referenced herein as Exhibit "H" we arrived at the following:
14
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$2,097,018.50 Divided by 225,144 Cubic Yards= $9.31 per Cubic Yard
R. p. 1588 (emphasis added).
19.

Sara Talley was a bookkeeping and accounting employee ofNorthgate's

related entity, Carter Construction. See R. p. 1612. On or about October 13, 2015, the
City deposed Ms. Talley to determine how the ''work location designations for each

v;

Greenfield invoice prepared by or under the direction of Sara Talley" and the "summary
documents, invoices and supporting calculations prepared by Sara Talley" upon which
Mr. Smith based his economic loss calculations had been prepared. See R. pp. 1437-39,
1611-18.
20.

In pertinent part, counsel for the City questioned Ms. Talley about invoices

she had prepared and an "apportionment document" marked as Exhibit 1 to her
deposition, which purported to allocate excavation costs to particular areas of the project.
See R. 1619-23. Regarding this allocation, which Northgate had deemed a requirement in

its discovery motion papers, Ms. Talley testified in pertinent part as follows:

Q. Okay. Let's start with the first page. It has No. 05488 at the bottom righthand comer. The first box up at the top it says, "Excavation costs through
August 1, 2008." And it's broken down into seven separate areas. What are
the areas you're referring to in that document?
A. There's a map which we referred to that had the areas. I believe the areas
were Orem City contracts.

Q. When you say "Orem City contracts," what do you mean by that?
A The purchase contracts.

Q. Do you believe this was a map that was attached to the Orem City
contract?
15
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A. No.
Q. Was it a map that had been created by you or someone in your office?
A. I don't know.
Q. How did you go about allocating the costs to the different areas?
A. I don't remember how that was done on that spreadsheet -- or on this
exhibit.

Q. What interest rate did you use to reach your interest costs calculation?
A. I don't remember.

Q. Down at the bottom you have a little text box here that talks about cubic
yards and it -- on the left column it says contract one through seven and
then numbers and then a total in the right-hand column. Where did you
obtain the yardage information that's listed on this?
A. I do not-Q. What was the source?
A. I do not remember.

Q. Now, in the fourth page of this exhibit you have a listing of the contracts
with A, B, C plus -- and then you have some percentages there. Can you tell
me what the percentages are and what they represent in the context of this
calculation?

THE WITNESS: They are an estimate of the percentage that that pit is
located in that contract.
16
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BY MR. HUNT: Q. Who made that estimate?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Did you ever go out in the field and look at these pits and make a survey
yourself?
A. I did go out in the field and look at the pits. I did not make a survey.
Q. So presumptively this percentage number was given to you by someone
else. Is that correct?
A. I don't remember.
Q. What was your objective in making these calculations? What was the
point of it all?

Vil
A. To provide a cost per contract area.
Q. An excavation cost?
A. Yes.
Q. Did these numbers include just excavation or did they also include soil
preparation and re-compaction costs? In other words, screening and
compaction and putting it back up to foundation level?
A. It includes the costs to bring it back up to foundation level. 6
Q. If you would just as kind of a summary, take me through your
methodology that you used to reach the final numbers that are on the first
page,just kind of step by step how you did this.
A. I don't remember specifically how the numbers on this first page in the
first area were figured. Methodology of the bookkeeping, the men
providing the work, the employees filled out timecards including the day
the work was done, a description of the work that was done, and where the
work was done, and how long they spent doing that work. Those timecards
6Tois

answer is significant because the Contract states that: "[t]he City shall not be
required to perform any filling or grading of the City Public Works Parcel, nor shall the
City be required to demolish or change any parking areas, drive areas or landscaped
areas." R. p. 37 (Contract, 4.3.2).
17
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were then entered into QuickBooks for payroll and job costing. From
QuickBooks I would export into Excel the specific payroll data for
invoicing and create the invoice.
Q. And from the total invoice numbers you applied these percentages we've
talked about to reach your ultimate amounts or do you remember?
A. I don't remember.

Q. Now, with respect to the page that's marked 05489 that you say was
prepared sometime in 2011, the total there seems to be about a million less
than the total on the first page of Exhibit 1. Do you see that? $2,089,982.15
versus $3,039,913.20.
A. Yes, I see that.

Q. What's the difference? Can you explain that to me?
A. Part of the difference is document No. 05489 does not include any of the
overhead and supervision or the interest costs that are showing on
document No. 05488. The other difference I do not know.

Q. When you made your calculations that are contained in Exhibit 1, did
you make any attempt to restrict those calculations to specific areas that
were mentioned in the environmental report as requiring cleanup? Do you
know?
A. No, I did not. I don't know which areas the environmental report states.

[BY MS. STEFFEY:] Q. And then with respect to the calculations on the
cubic yardage removed, I believe you were asked if you'd ever surveyed the
pits. Were you able to run calculations on how much yardage was actually
removed?
A. No. I don't even know how to do that.

18
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BY l\1R. HUNT: Q. Where then did the calculations come from on the
yardage calculations on your report?

VD

A. I don't remember.

Q. Can you think, as you sit here, of where they might be contained in any
typical job documentation that Carter or Greenfield would keep?

\/4)

A. No, I don't-- I can't think of anything. I don't remember where those
numbers came from.
R. pp. 1613-18 (emphasis added).
21.
vJ

On or about December 17, 2015, the district court entered its Pretrial and

Trial Scheduling Order, establishing January 15, 2016, as the deadline for all pretrial
motions. See R. pp. 1543-46. This final scheduling order did not purport to affect or
extend in any way the November 1, 2015, deadline for deposing experts established by
the court's June 18, 2015, Scheduling Order. See id. See also R. pp. 1418-21.
22.

Pursuant to the court's Pretrial Scheduling Order, on January 15, 2016, the

City filed its Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony. See R. pp. 1547-1629. In support,
the City pointed out that the "opinions of Messrs. Smith and Bosley [were] both critically
based on an apportionment study performed by a former employee of one of
[Northgate's] members, one Sara Stevens (nee Talley), which [study] Ms. Stevens was
unable to reasonably articulate, defend, and/or remember." See R. pp. 1547-48, 1549-50.
23.

Northgate opposed this motion, not by attempting to demonstrate that the

invoices and apportionments Ms. Talley had prepared and which the experts had
~

expressly stated they relied upon were in fact adequate to support the damage
calculations, but by filing sworn Declarations from each expert asserting for the first time
19
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that in fact "neither Mr. Bosley nor Mr. Smith relied upon the Apportionment Study
[prepared by Ms. Talley] in rendering their opinions." See R. p. 1678.
24.

Deane Smith declared both that he had relied on "[i]nvoices prepared by or

under the direction of Sara Talley," and that he "did not rely on the 'Apportionment
Document' prepared by Sara [Talley]," which she, in turn, had prepared based upon
invoices. R. p. 1756. But see R. pp. 1563-64 (Smith Report stating that "[a]t the request
of counsel for the plaintiff, Northgate Village Development, LLC [Northgate], an
examination of summary documents, invoices and supporting calculations prepared by
Sara Talley acting on behalf of Northgate and a related entity, Carter Construction
Company, was conducted."); see also id. p. 1567 ("Source: Selected accounting entries
from Carter Construction Company books and records for Greenfield Excavation
Company as provided by Sara Talley.").
25.

Although his declaration was filed long after his previous reports dated

May 2011 and July 2015, and after Mr. Bosley did additional calculations, Mr. Smith
went on to "declare" for the first time that he relied upon "Cubic footage of the
excavation pits calculated by PROMAC." R. p. 1756.
26.

Similarly, Mr. Bosley declared that "PROMAC did not rely on the

'Apportionment Document' prepared by Sara [Talley], a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit C. In fact, I have no recollection relative to any review of the Apportionment
Document until preparing this declaration." R. p. 1780. But see R. p. 1588 ("Total
Remediation Costs (Ref. [Smith] 2011 Report)= $2,539,053.50") (emphasis added).
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27.

For the first time, Mr. Bosley went on to "declare" that, rather than relying

upon Ms. Talley and Mr. Smith to determine quantities, he actually relied upon:
a. A quantity survey which was based on data collected during the
remediation process was inserted into an AutoCAD program together with
other relevant datum information. The information used was obtained from
licensed trained professionals and is information typically generated by and
used in the construction industry. The quantities represented under the
heading "Quantity Survey" in the report which PROMAC prepared were
arrived at through this process.
b. We interviewed Travis Cottam, the Superintendent who oversaw the
remediation efforts, and Sarah Stevens, the accountant charged with
accumulating invoices relative to the cost of the remediation work.
However, our only purpose in interviewing these two individuals was to
gain an understanding relative to the means and methods used to remediate
the site.
R. p. 1861.
28.

~

In its Reply Memorandum, the City pointed out that:
Northgate has filed Declarations from its experts L. Deane Smith
and Roy Bosley abandoning any reference to the "pits" delineated by Sara
Talley Stevens in her apportionment study, which was the only basis to
geographically locate any of the costs incurred by Northgate in the invoices
it produced to support its claim for damages in this case. Northgate then
shifted its theory to a market-based valuation relying primarily on undimensioned photographs that were superimposed over a topographic map
and then used to estimate excavation quantities. This computational
approach is unprecedented, and using Declarations to clarify the approach
merely seeks to amend the Reports to address the deficiencies identified in
the opening motion.

After this case was sent back from the Court of Appeals and the
geographic focal point of potential damages was narrowed to Areas 2 and 7
identified in the ''written action plan" (Ex. F) attached to the Purchase
Contract, L. Deane Smith narrowed the damages he could attribute to these
two geographic areas based on Sara Stevens' (nee Talley) apportionment
study by excluding the costs incurred outside of those two areas and
21
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subtracting it from his original estimate. Both Mr. Smith's original estimate
filed in 2011, and his later estimate filed in July, 2015, relied on the Sara
Stevens apportionment study. Mr. Smith did not file a rebuttal report in
December, 2015 as did Messrs. Bosley and Dahle, but in the Declaration
that he filed in support of the Northgate opposition to the pending Motion,
he takes a different tack and adopts cubic footage calculations from the
Bosley report. [Deel. of Smith, ,r 5]. Note that the Smith Declaration
attempts to bootstrap itself by relying on the Promac (Bosley) Report that
was prepared after the final Smith Report was completed and filed.

Mr. Bosley did not file a report prior to the appeal. Rather, Northgate
relied wholly on the L. Deane Smith Report. After the appeal (and the filing
of the City's initial reports pointing out the deficiencies of the first Smith
Report), Northgate filed Mr. Bosley's report which largely abandoned any
attempt to directly rely on the invoices and the actual costs that Northgate
had incurred, presumably because none of those costs could be connected
to a geographic location. Mr. Bosley did, however, indirectly use Sara
Stevens' reference to pits in order to locate generally where work was
performed by incorporating and utilizing the conclusions of the L. Deane
Smith Reports. An interesting but troubling pattern emerges here where
Smith relies on the Bosley report for quantities because Smith cannot
calculate any from the project documents provided by Northgate, and
Bosley relies on the Smith report for amounts and pit designations, both of
which tie back to Sara Stevens, who could not remember much of anything,
and certainly could not recall sufficient detail to render her information
reliable enough to be used in their analyses.
R. pp. 1896-98.
29.

On April 29, 2016, the district court granted the City's Motion to Exclude

Expert Testimony, ruling in pertinent part as follows:
In regards to the expert opinions of Mr. Smith and Bosley, the Court is
placed in a particularly difficult situation. On one hand, according to the
City's motion, both experts, either directly or indirectly, relied on the
apportionment study conducted by [Sara Talley]. The City references
several stateinents to support its conclusion that the [Talley] apportionment
study is flawed and unreliable. Northgate doesn't contest this assertion. If
Smith and Bosley relied on the apportionment study, then the opinions of
Smith and Bosley fail to meet the threshold showing of reliability and are
thus inadmissible.
22
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~

On the other hand, Northgate asserts that both experts did not rely on the
Stevens' apportionment study. N orthgate attempts to supplement the reports
of Smith and Bosley by attaching declarations from each on the
methodology they used to calculate their damages to its opposition
memorandum. Northgate asserts that the information used was obtained
from licensed trained professionals and is information typically generated
by and used in the construction industry. If Smith and Bosley's reports were
based upon such data, then their opinions would meet the threshold
showing of reliability and are thus admissible. But the City challenges such
assertions stating that both reports tie back to Stevens.

vi)

The Court is tasked with determining the methodology used by the expert
witnesses in order to determine its reliability. The reports themselves do not
disclose such information. The Court can only rely on the sworn
declarations by the experts themselves, which state that they did not rely on
the [Talley'] apportionment study. Thus, the Court finds that the
methodology used by Smith and Bosley meets the threshold showing of
reliability under Rule 702.
Notwithstanding, the City argues, and the Court acknowledges and
recognizes, that such information was not provided in the expert reports and
the inclusions of the declarations are a form of supplementation after the
deadlines. In fact, had the City not filed its motion, it is likely that the City
would have gone to trial without knowing the methodology employed by
Smith or Bosley in determining their opinion.
The Court notes that this case has been pending for seven years with trial
scheduled for June 13 -- 17. To provide such documentations after the
close of discovery and so close to trial prejudices the City because they are
unable to rebut the methodology relied upon by Smith and Bosley with
witnesses of their own.
Both in its opposition memorandum and at oral argument, Northgate failed
to show that the failure to disclose was harmless or that it showed good
cause for its failure to disclose. Instead, Northgate argued that the burden
was on the City to depose their expert witnesses if it wanted to know what
methodology it relied on when writing its reports and that it had no duty to
provide such information. The expert reports failed to contain 'all data and
other information that will be relied upon by the witness in forming those
opinions.' Utah R. Civ. P. 26. As such, the Court will exclude the expert
testimony of Smith and Bosley under Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) for failing to
comply with Rule 26 disclosures.
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R. pp 2127-29.
30.

Also on January 15, 2016, the City filed its Motion to Exclude Evidence

RE: Fill Material. See R. pp. 1661-67. As grounds, the City asserted that this Court
remanded the case in pertinent part ''to allow the district court to hear evidence regarding
the parties' intent with respect to asphalt clean-up." Id Evidence referring or relating to
the existence of material other than asphalt ("urban detritus") discovered long after the
parties had entered the Contract, the clean-up of such material, and costs of such cleanup, had no probative value as to the parties' intent with respect to the asphalt the parties
knew was present, and should therefore be excluded pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 403. Id.
31.

On May 9, 2016, the district court denied the City's motion in part7 and

granted it in part, reasoning as follows:
In this case, evidence regarding the City's removal of the
transformers is relevant because it has a tendency to make the fact in
question -- whether the City was bound under the Agreement to remove
asphalt from the property in question -- more or less probable than that fact
would be without the evidence. As asphalt is listed in the same
environmental-hazard list as are the transformers, the City's action in
connection with the transformers is probative in helping the jury decide if
the City was obligated, by virtue of the Agreement, to also remove asphalt
from the property in question. Under Rule 403, the probative value of this
evidence substantially outweighs any unfair prejudice to the City ....
In contrast, evidence regarding Northgate's removal of other
construction material aside from the asphalt, including the ''urban detritus,"
is not relevant. Evidence is considered relevant if it ( 1) contributes to the
probability or not of a fact in question; and (2) if the fact in question "is of
consequence in determining the action." Utah R. Evid. 401. The evidence
regarding N orthgate' s removal of construction material not containing
7The

City had also moved to exclude evidence of actions it had taken with respect to
buried transformers. As illustrated by the quote below, the district court denied that
aspect of the City's motion and it is not at issue here.
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asphalt, however, contributes nothing to the fact in question: whether the
City was bound under the Agreement to remove asphalt from the property.
Therefore, it is not relevant in determining the interpretation of the
Agreement.
Northgate argues that the admission of such evidence is probative to
ascertaining both Northgate's mitigation of damages and the damages it
indeed sustained. Yet the City's responsibility regarding landfill material
not containing asphalt is not at question in this case per the Court of
Appeal's ruling; the Clean-Up List does not include a provision for such
landfill material. Therefore, under the Court of Appeal's ruling, that
material has no bearing in this case. ("[W]e agree that the Land Sales
Contract obligated the City 'to perform only those cleanup actions listed in
the ... Clean-Up List attached to the agreement."') Northgate Village Dev.,
L. C., 2014 UT App 86, ,r 31. ). Were the jury to decide that the City did
have an obligation to remove the landfilling construction materials with
pieces of asphalt, it could not remove the asphalt separately from the urban
detritus (as Northgate found), and the percentage of urban detritus
excavated on the property amounted to only 5-10% of the total debris
excavated, a negligible expense. Northgate may argue that it had to pay
dumping fees for the urban detritus; be that as it may, Northgate also saved
costs in crushing the construction material containing asphalt and re-filling
the excavation site with it. Therefore, introduction of evidence regarding
the other construction material aside from the asphalt is not relevant;
moreover, it would be more prejudicial than probative.

ti)

vJ

See R. 2309-11.
32.

'-:i

On May 20, 2016, the district court entered its Order on Stipulated Motion

to Stay Proceedings, which stayed the jury trial otherwise set to begin on June 13, 2016,
and all other pre-trial management deadlines pending the Ruling of this Court. See
Docket.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court excluded Northgate's expert testimony regarding damages
~

because it became evident that during the excavation phase ofNorthgate's project the
parties involved had made no effort to track or document the location where particular
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expenses were incurred. The invoices were general and absolutely no geographic
references were included. Consequently, when this court's prior opinion limited the
geographic areas where recoverable damages could have been incurred to particular
Areas 2 & 7, Northgate had no documentary evidence to make such a determination.
Its experts had cited to an "apportionment study" that Sara Talley had prepared.
But, when Ms. Talley was deposed, her information proved to be unreliable to such a
degree that no reasonable person could rely on it to make expert conclusions. By the
time Ms. Talley was deposed and the depositions transcribed, the deadlines for further
expert reports had passed and no further supplementation of the expert disclosures
occurred.
Thus only after the City's pretrial Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony was filed,
did Northgate belatedly attempt to amend its expert reports by filing untimely
Declarations that Judge Davis appropriately found, in the exercise of his discretion, to be
improper. In doing so, he protected the City from a damage theory that had become a
moving target due to the poor quality of the evidentiary records kept by Northgate. This
is as it should be and as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly contemplate. The
ruling below should thus be affirmed.
In granting the motion respecting fill materials, Judge Davis was attempting to
avoid error by utilizing his inherent pretrial evidentiary discretion to not allow the
admission of irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence that failed to prove any material
fact, but was rather inflammatory and misleading. The ruling was correct, a proper
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exercise of discretion and furthered the trial judge's role as gatekeeper to keep error out
of the trial court record. It should be accordingly affirmed as well.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION
IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONY FROM NORTHGATE'S EXPERTS WHO,
AFTER SUBMITTING DETAILED EXPERT REPORTS DESCRIBING
THE BASES FOR THEffi OPINIONS DURING THE DISCOVERY
PERIOD, FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR
THEIR OPINIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE CITY'S MOTION FILED
AFTER FACT AND EXPERT DISCOVERY HAD CLOSED.
The Supreme Court described the standard for review of the district court's

decision in Bodell Const. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52:
In applying the abuse of discretion standard to the district court's imposition
of a particular sanction, we give the district court "a great deal of latitude in
determining the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business"
because the district court judge "is in the best position to evaluate the status
of his [or her] cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the
parties." Thus, we will determine that a district court "has abused its
discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if there is either an
erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for the [district] court's
ruling."
2009 UT 52,, 35 (quoting Morton v. Cont'/ Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271,274 (Utah 1997)

"'

(brackets in original). In this case the district court's legal conclusions are thoroughly
supported by both versions of the applicable rules, and its order is supported by sound
evidentiary bases.
Northgate's first and primary argument in this regard appears to be that the district
court based its sanction solely on an erroneous conclusion of law because in its ruling the

~

court mentioned the current version of Rule 26, rather than the version of Rule 26 that
was superseded on November 1, 2011, but applicable to this case by virtue of the filing
27
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date. See Northgate Br., pp. 28-29. Northgate argues it "has been unduly prejudiced by
being held to a materially different standard that it had no reason to know would be

6v

applied." Id. p. 29. This argument fails both legally and factually.
First, Northgate's characterizations of the superseded but applicable Rules'

6£.,

requirements are incorrect. The version of the Rules in effect when this case was filed
required Northgate to provide "a written report prepared and signed by the witness." See
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B)(2009). In pertinent part, the Rule went on to require that:
[t]he report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is expected
to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify; [and] a summary of the grounds for each opinion[.]

Id. See also Utah R. Civ. P. 26(e)(l) (2009) ("A party is under a duty to supplement at
appropriate intervals disclosures under subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some
material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional
or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during
the discovery process or in writing").
Interpreting the superseded version of the Rules, Utah Appellate Courts have
upheld district court sanctions for failure to adequately comply with expert disclosure and
other disclosure requirements in multiple instances. In Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, the
Utah Supreme Court applied the superseded version of Rule 26 and upheld sanctions
imposed for disclosure of expert reports that "identified the proposed subject matter of
[the first expert's] testimony only in the most cursory way," and "contained only vague
descriptions of [the second expert's] proposed testimony." Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 1180, 81.
As a caution to counsel, the Court noted:

28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

Pretrial discovery and disclosure are basic skills that we expect all attorneys
to possess. Our already overworked district court judges should not be
required to provide remedial instructions to counsel on how to properly
conduct discovery, designate trial exhibits, or prepare expert reports. Our
courts rely heavily on the competence and diligence of counsel. The
evidentiary rulings Ms. Dahl complains of were largely the result of her
counsel's inability to follow basic rules of procedure and properly manage
discovery. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in its pretrial evidentiary rulings.
Id.

Similarly, in Bodell Const. Co., 2009 UT 52, the Court upheld the exclusion of an
expert witness report pursuant to the superseded Rule 26 because "[t]he damages theories
advanced in the Weight Report were not disclosed during the requisite discovery period."
2009 UT 52,136. See also Dahl v. Harrison, 2011 UT App. 389,122 (Applying the
superseded Rule 26 and noting that "where a party does not timely file expert disclosures,
the court will ordinarily exclude the party's expert from testifying at trial on the matters
the party was required to disclose. Indeed, the sanction of exclusion is automatic and
mandatory unless the sanctioned party can show that the violation of Rule 26(a) was
either justified or harmless."). Compare Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title,
2016 UT App 62 (upholding sanction striking supplemental damage disclosures served

vo

after fact discovery closed based upon superseded Rule 26).
Accordingly, the superseded Rules that Northgate argues should govern the

i.Ji1

district court's decision provide the district court with a sound legal basis to impose
sanctions for failures to appropriately disclose expert and damage evidence. Id.
Moreover, while the district court mentioned the disclosure requirements that are also
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required under the new Rule, the district court did not simply rely solely on the new Rule
26 in imposing sanctions, as Northgate now argues. See Northgate Br. pp. 27-29.
Rather, the court found that Northgate had failed to disclose important details
about the bases of its experts' opinions in their reports and then imposed the sanction
pursuant to the discretion allowed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 3 7( f) , superseded 201 _1,
which was unquestionably applicable to the case. See R. pp. 2128-29. In doing so, the
district court expressly made the findings required by the applicable Rule 37(f) -- that
Northgate's failures to disclose were both harmful and unexcused. Id.
Thus, Northgate fails to establish that the district court's sanction decision was
based upon any erroneous legal conclusion, and it should be upheld assuming the
decision had evidentiary support. See Bodell Const. Co., 2009 UT 52,135. ("[W]e will
~

determine that a district court 'has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to
impose only if there is either an erroneous conclusion oflaw or no evidentiary basis for
the [district] court's ruling."').
And there is abundant evidentiary support for the district court's sanction decision.
Northgate argues in this regard that the Declarations of Bosley and Smith did nothing
more than "expand the explanation of how PROMAC used the information it relied
upon" and "restate what was already set forth in the Smith Report." See Northgate Br.
pp. 29-33. But this argument does not accurately describe the evidence before the district
court.
For example, Smith's expert reports state that his conclusions were "[b]ased on
work location designation for each Greenfield invoice prepared by or under the direction
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of Sara Talley ... " See Statement of Facts, supra ,r,r 4, 6 and 17. The Bosley report then
simply adopted the remediation costs conclusion made by Smith, which as stated by
Smith, were based on the work of Sara Talley. See id.

,r 18.

See also id.

,r,r 22, 24 and

25.
As the district court found, Northgate did not contest the assertion that Talley's
apportionment study was flawed and unreliable and that "[i]f Smith and Bosley relied on
Vil

the apportionment study, then the opinions of Smith and Bosley fail to meet the threshold
showing of reliability and are thus inadmissible." See R. p. 2128. The district court
1./J

noted that it "was tasked with determining the methodology used by the expert witnesses
in order to determine its reliability" but that it "can only rely on the sworn declarations by
the experts themselves, which state that they did not rely on [Sara Talley's]
apportionment study." Id.
Only then, upon this "correction" presented through the Declarations of Smith and

Bosley filed after fact and expert discovery had closed stating that they did not rely on
Sara Talley's study, did the district court rule that the methodology used by Smith and
Bosley met the threshold showing of reliability. Id. The district court found this
substantive change to be "a form of supplementation after the deadlines," and went on to
note:
In fact, had the City not filed its motion [in reliance upon the
previously disclosed bases for the expert opinions], it is likely that the City
would have gone to trial without knowing the methodology employed by
Smith or Bosley in determining their opinion.
The Court notes that this case has been pending for seven years with
trial scheduled for June 13-17. To provide such documentation after the
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close of discovery and so close to trial prejudices the City because they are
unable to rebut the methodology relied upon by Smith and Bosley with
witnesses of their own.

Wv

Both in its opposition memorandum and at oral argument, Northgate
failed to show that the failure to disclose was harmless or that it showed
good cause for its failure to disclose.
R. pp. 2128-29.
Further, even assuming that the expert disclosure provisions of the superseded
~

version of Rule 26 only required Northgate to disclose notice of its experts' opinions and
not the actual bases for the opinions, as N orthgate suggests should be the case here, in
applying the superseded version or Rule 26 this Court has recently confirmed that the
"fact of damages and the method for calculating the amount of damages must be apparent
in initial disclosures" and that a claimant must timely supplement these disclosures.
(Ii¾,,

Sleepy Holdings, 2016 UT App 62, 1114, 18 {Affirming the exclusion of an expert's
testimony under superseded Rule 26 when a claimant failed to supplement disclosures
within the discovery period and identify damages or "offer a computation or method of
calculating the damages as required by law").
Here, and as the district court noted, Northgate never supplemented its disclosures
to provide the additional, corrective information about its experts' methodology until
after all discovery deadlines had passed and shortly before trial in response to the City's
motion. As this Court noted in Sleepy Holdings:
Rules 26(a) and 26(e) require the parties to make initial disclosures and to
supplement those disclosures as necessary. The sanctions for rule 26(a) and
26(e) violations appear in rule 37(f). When a party fails to timely make or
supplement initial disclosures, rule 37(f) mandates that the district court
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~

exclude the untimely disclosure unless the failure to disclose is harmless or
the non-disclosing party shows good cause for its non-disclosure[.]
2016 UT App 62, ,I 21 (applying superseded Rule 26).
Northgate goes on to argue that the City suffered no prejudice or could have cured
such prejudice because it received the Declarations of Smith and Bosley correcting their
reports "during the time period in which [the City] could have taken depositions" and that
\tiP

the City could have "cured any prejudicial surprise it claims it may have suffered" by
taking those depositions. See Northgate Br. pp. 35-34. This argument is also incorrect as
the district court specifically found.
As set forth above, the district court's scheduling order in effect on January 15,
2016, when the City filed its motion addressing Northgate's expert disclosures expressly
required that all expert depositions, "if any," were to have been conducted by no later
than November 1, 2015. See Statement of Facts, supra 119. While Northgate deposed

~

the City's experts after this deadline, the City stipulated to allow those depositions
primarily to avoid a discovery dispute. Certainly it was not the City's burden to move to
extend deadlines to obtain information that Northgate's disclosures did not provide. See,
e.g., RJW Media v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, ,I 29 ("An insufficient disclosure by one

party does not shift the burden and risk to resolve the insufficient disclosure to the other
L1i>

party, who now must either seek court intervention or waive objections to the sufficiency
of the disclosure.").
As the district court acknowledged and recognized, "this case has been pending for
seven years with trial scheduled for June 13-17. To provide such documentation after the
33
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close ofdiscovery and so close to trial prejudices the City because they are unable to
rebut the methodology relied upon by Smith and Bosley with witnesses of their own." R.
p. 2129 (emphasis added). Northgate has not set forth any facts contrary to this
conclusion and the district court's determination based thereon. See Bodell Const,". Co.,
2009 UT 52, 1136-38 (rejecting argument that plaintiff "complied with generally
accepted litigation practices" when he "disclosed its damages theories during fact
discovery and then laid them out in greater detail in an expert report produced during the
expert discovery period" only three weeks later).
Finally, Northgate notes that the district court applied the superseded version of
Rule 3 7, and goes on to argue:
that provision was deleted from the new rule 37, which requires the filing
of a statement of discovery issues, in which a party certifies that it has
attempted to confer in good faith to resolve the dispute. Orem did not
comply with the new rule 37 requirements. By applying the new standards
set forth in the New Rule 26, but then applying the sanctions authorized by
the old rule 37, the trial court cherry picked provisions of old and new
rules, regardless of applicability, to support its ruling. Such an abuse of
discretion is not harmless, and this Court should therefore reverse the trial
court.
Northgate Br. p. 29. This argument also fails.
First, of course, the substantive provisions of the superseded Rule 37(f) have not
simply been "deleted" as Northgate implies. Rather they have been expressly
incorporated in the 2011 revisions to Rule 26. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4) (2016). As
with the versions of the rules discussed above, the same outcome is mandated under
either the current Rule 26 or the former Rule 3 7.
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Further, the fact that the district court relied upon the superseded, but nevertheless
applicable, Rule 37(f) in imposing its sanction undermines Northgate's argument that the
district court's decision was based upon an erroneous conclusion of law. Even conceding
~

the district court should look only to the superseded version of the Rules, the district
court expressly relied upon the appropriate version of Rule 37(f) in imposing its sanction,
rather than upon an "erroneous conclusion of law."
II.

NORTHGATE FAILED TO PRESERVE ITS PRIMARY ARGUMENT
CONTENDING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING
EVIDENCE OF LANDFILLING MATERIALS (URBAN DETRITUS)
OTHER THAN ASPHALT; AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE DISTRICT
COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECIDING TO EXCLUDE THE EVIDENCE.

Criticizing the district court's decision to exclude evidence of "urban detritus"
other than asphalt, Northgate argues for the first time on appeal that the district court
erred by misinterpreting the parties' contract:
In its Fill Order, the trial court excluded evidence of all landfill construction
material not containing asphalt because the court determined such material
"is not at question in this case per the Court of Appeals' ruling; the CleanUp List does not include a provision for such landfill material." (R.2256.)
However, the Clean-Up List expressly lists "landfilling construction
material with pieces of asphalt." The trial court's ruling misinterprets and
misapplies the Court of Appeals' ruling by improperly limiting the type of
buried debris listed on the Clean-Up List. As the Clean-Up List identifies
construction material, evidence of any landfilling construction material is
not only relevant but is necessary to quantify the full measure of damages.
As a result, the trial court's Fill Order is erroneous and should be reversed.
See Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 2016 UT 6, ,Il5.
Northgate's Br. p. 35. See also id. p. 2 ("[T]he interpretation of a contract is a legal
question.").
In response to the City's motion below, however, Northgate argued only that:

35
lJ

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence of the excavation [of] other buried debris with the construction
materials with pieces of asphalt is highly probative to both the
reasonableness of the cost of cleaning up the construction materials with
pieces of asphalt and N orthgate' s actions to mitigate its damages. As such,
exclusion of such evidence would be prejudicial error.
R. pp. 1840, 1839-43. See also id. p. 2256 (the district court noting that "Northgate
argues that the admission of such evidence is probative to ascertaining both Northgate's
mitigation of damages and the damages it indeed sustained.").
As the Supreme Court has noted:
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue." ... For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the
error "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must
be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Issues that are not raised at
trial are usually deemed waived.
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,I 51 (citations omitted).
Here, Northgate did not mention its contract interpretation argument, cite the
authority it now relies upon, or give the district court an opportunity to rule on the
argument and provide its reasoning. Accordingly, the argument should be deemed
waived. Id.
Addressing the argument on the merits, this Court's prior opinion made clear that,
interpreting the parties' agreement as a whole, the City's clean-up obligations involved
only environmental hazards posed by buried transformers and asphalt, but that ''the
Clean-Up List does not clearly indicate how the City must deal with buried asphalt." See
Northgate Village Dev., L.C., 2014 UT App 86,136; see also id 137 n.4 and 5. The
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Court remanded ''to hear evidence regarding the parties' intent with respect to asphalt
clean-up ...." Id. 155.
Northgate's contract interpretation argument conflates the limited issues presented
~

by the remand as to the parties' intent at the time the parties contracted with their damage
theory, and ignores the context of the case when Judge Davis made his decision. The
question after remand was whether the parties intended the Contract to obligate the City

~

to clean up buried asphalt. Id Although Northgate now argues that the phrase
"landfilling materials with pieces of asphalt" obligated the City to also clean-up the
~

''urban detritus," there is no evidence the contracting parties expressly contemplated or
even knew about the so-called "urban detritus" at the time the Clean-up List was
prepared.
Thus the evidence could not bear on the narrow intent issue remanded to the
district court because that inquiry is limited to evidence that existed at the time the parties
were negotiating and writing the contract. See Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, 17
("Relevant, extrinsic evidence 'of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered

\ah

the [contract]' is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract is
ambiguous."). As in the Nielsen case, "[i]t is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on
the integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. An

0P

agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite." Id.

1 11.

That there was no meeting of the minds and thus no contract with respect to
~

removal of "urban detritus" is implicit in the district court's ruling. Reading the contract
as a whole, the City had to deal only with the items (transformers and asphalt) that
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constituted environmental hazards. Northgate's criticism of the district court's decision
essentially takes the phrase "Landfilling construction materials with pieces of asphalt" out
of context in order to impose additional obligations the agreement does not contemplate.
Below, Northgate argued that evidence of all materials was relevant to its claim
that it had to mitigate damages. R. pp. 1840, 1839-43. However, the City elected not to
assert mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense and whether Northgate did in fact
mitigate its damages is of no consequence to this case. See R. 94-101. See Pratt v. Bd.

OfEducation, 564 P. 2d 294, 298 (Utah, 1977) ("Mitigation of damages is an affirmative
defense. Although plaintiff is obligated to mitigate his damages, the burden is on the
party whose wrongful act caused the damages to prove anything in diminution thereof.")

ajf'd. on rehearing, 569 P. 2d 1112 (Utah, 1977).
The district court recognized this in finding the evidence regarding N orthgate' s
clean-up of non-environmentally sensitive materials, the so-called "urban detritus,"
referenced by this Court's prior opinion, not probative. "The evidence regarding
Northgate's removal of construction material not containing asphalt, however,
contributes nothing to the fact in question: whether the City was bound under the
Agreement to remove asphalt from the property." R. p. 2256.
Moreover, even if the evidence of landfill materials might be considered to have
some tangential relevance, the district court concluded that, per Rule 403, its prejudicial
effect outweighed any probative value and the evidence should be excluded on that
<&.,
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basis. 8 Importantly, the court found and Northgate does not dispute that Northgate did
not in fact remove asphalt from the site, but instead crushed the fill material containing
asphalt and used it to refill the excavation site.
Under such circumstances, where the remand order of this Court was for the
district court to "hear evidence regarding the parties' intent with respect to asphalt cleanup," evidence that Northgate removed "urban detritus" but not asphalt, would be of no
probative value and its admission into evidence would only serve to unfairly prejudice
the City. The Court correctly found that evidence regarding Northgate's removal of
~

urban detritus was more prejudicial than probative.

8

Northgate's Brief exemplifies how it intends to use the presence of the urban detritus on
the site in its arguments here and presumably before the jury. By characterizing the
City's operations on the property as an "illegal dump" (Northgate Br. p.4) and arguing
that operation of a landfill violated City Code and state law (Id fu. 2), demonstrates
Northgate's intent to use the presence of these materials on site to create prejudice and
inflame the sensibilities of the fact finder. Northgate insists on pursuing these
characterizations and arguments despite the fact that its claim for alleged violation of
environmental laws was dismissed by the trial court on September 28, 2009, and upheld
in the first appeal. 2014 UT App. 86, tjf55.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the City respectfully requests this Court's Ruling and
Order upholding the decision of the district court which Northgate appeals from here.
~
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